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CASE NOTES
That portion of the injunction relating to delayed broadcasts, and syn-
dicated and feature films, may work a serious hardship to CATV because, as
the court indicated, the rights of local stations in these programs extends for
a period of twenty-one days after the network broadcast?' Thus the local
station may assert its right of first-call anytime within this twenty-one day
period; and, until this right is exercised and the choice made known, CATV
may not safely pick up any of these broadcasts. This problem may not prove
as serious a hardship as anticipated if, as is the custom, the local station
makes known in advance the schedule of its anticipated broadcasts. This is
not to minimize, however, the undoubted impact of this sweeping injunction
on CATV.
The court did refer to the views expressed by the FCC, 25 which indicated
a desire to subject CATV to its rules. These rules require the consent of the
originating station before a program may be reproduced by another broad-
caster.26 Congress has consistently refused to extend control over CATV to
the FCC.27
It is submitted that the result of the decision in the present case subjects
CATV to a more stringent requirement than even the FCC advocates, for
now CATV is prohibited from picking up these programs even if it has ob-
tained the permission of the broadcaster. This demonstrates what prompted
Mr. Justice Brandeis' admonition of caution on the part of courts when deal-
ing with this sensitive problem. The decree effectively limits the available
selection of television programs to the people of Twin Fails and prefers an
artificial property right to the interest of the general public. It remains to be
seen whether Congress anticipated this reaction to its refusal to extend the
authority of the FCC.
LEWIS ROSENBERG
Contributor
Constitutional Law—Due Process—Blacklisting—Agency Action with-
out a Hearing.—Kukatusb Mining Corp. v. SEC. 1—A nonresident alien
corporation having no assets and doing no business in the United States
sought a preliminary injunction against the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion to have its name removed from the "Canadian Restricted List." 2 The
corporation alleged that (I) its name was placed on the list without any no-
24 211 F. Supp. at 54.
25 Id. at 55. See also FCC 28th Ann, Rep. 65, 66 (1962).
25 Ibid.
27 211 F. Supp. at 55. Two recent bills were H.R. Rep. No. 6840, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1961), S. Rep. No. 1044, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). See also, Inquiry into the
Impact of CATV, T.V. Translators, T.V. "Satellite" Stations and T.V. "Repeaters" on the
Orderly Development of T.V. Broadcasting, 26 F.C.C. 403 (1959).
1 309 F.2d 647 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
2 The Canadian Restricted List is a list of Canadian companies whose securities the
Commission has reason to believe have been or are being distributed in the United States
in violation of the registration requirements of the Securities Act. of 1933. See SEC
Securities Act Release No. 3632 (1956). For SEC policy on deletions, see Release No.
4240 (1960).
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tice to the appellant and without affording the corporation any opportunity to
be heard; (2) that the corporation stock has never been publicly offered, sold
or distributed in the United States; and (3) that the corporation has been
injured financially and has been stigmatized throughout the financial world.
On appeal from the order granting the SEC motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court, affirmed on other
grounds. HELD: The appellants, as nonresident aliens having no assets in
this country on which to base jurisdiction, have no standing to sue. In addi-
tion the court stated that the "Canadian Restricted List" is not a blacklist
and is thus not violative of due process because the appellant's rights are in
no way adjudicated, the list being directed toward the actions of third parties
and not those of the appellants.
In Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath,' the Attorney General
published, pursuant to Executive Order 9835, 4
 a list which designated plain-
tiffs as subversive but which afforded no basis of action against them. Plain-
tiffs, asserting they were charitable, fraternal and cultural, and business
organizations, respectively, sought injunctive and declaratory relief against
being placed on the list without notice or hearing. They alleged financial,
reputation and character losses, but made no denial about being subversive.
The Supreme Court, reversing a lower court decision which had dismissed for
lack of a justiciable suit, held that the plaintiffs had stated a cause of action
and they consequently had standing to sue. The Court, in reaching its deci-
sion, emphasized the finality of the listing by the Attorney General, the arbi-
trariness with which the listing was done, and the defamatory remarks which
resulted in serious economic consequences for the organizations.
Prior to Joint Anti-Fascist, the jurisdictional requirement that a case or
controversy be present was not met where the challenged governmental ac-
tivity had no legally compulsive effect on the one who sought to attack it. 5
That decision seemed to extend the concept of justiciability, affording one an
increased ability to be removed from the government list by granting standing
to sue to one suffering irreparable injury as a result of governmental action
without regard to the fact that the immediate end in view was not regulation
of their organizations but internal government security' However, this im-
plication has not been followed to the extent the majority opinion in Joint
Anti-Fascist would indicate. The courts rather have followed the concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 7
 where the validity of the governmental
activity is viewed as flexible, varying with the particular situation and the
importance of the public and private interests involved.
The precise nature of the interest that has been adversely affected,
the manner in which this was done, the reasons for doing it, the
available alternatives to the procedure that was followed, the pro-
tection implicit in the office of the functionary whose conduct is
3 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
4
 12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (1947).
6
 Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1938) ; United States v. Los
Angeles & Salt L. Ry. Co., 273 U.S. 299 (1912) ; Fay v. Miller, 183 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir.
1950).
6
 Comment, 20 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 294, 313 (1952).
7
 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 155 (5th Cir. 1961).
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challenged, the balance of the hurt complained of and the good ac-
complished—these are some of the considerations that must enter
into the judicial judgment. 8
Similarly, in Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy,9 the
petitioner was a cook in a cafeteria operated by a private concession located
in a naval gun factory. Because she failed to meet security requirements,
she was denied access to the factory and thus lost her job. The Court held
that the exclusion from the premises without a hearing and without advice as
to the specific grounds for her exclusion did not violate due process. The
Court in reaching its decision said, "Consideration of what procedures due
process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a
determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as
well as of the private interest that has been affected by the governmental
action."10 Consistent with Mr. Justice Frankfurter's balancing of interest
standard is Greene v. McElroy"- where the governmental ex parte determina-
tion so directly affected Greene's employment rights, as opposed to the com-
paratively minor right involved in the Cafeteria case, that a hearing was re-
quired. In the latter decision the employer offered the employee a job in his
cafeteria in another city whereas in the former the employee, after dismissal,
was not able to obtain employment as an aeronautical engineer.
In the balancing of interest standard, the interest of the individual is in-
creased as the communication or listing is more specifically directed toward
his activities. The courts distinguish communications concerning a general-
ized type of activity12 from one which is directed toward the plaintiff as a
special target, 13 granting standing to sue in the latter. The Court in B. C.
Morton Int'l Corp. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.' 4
 held that there is an
actual "controversy" where the FDIC issues a press release which on its face
purports to be a general statement to the public, but is in fact specifically
directed at the plaintiff for the purpose of interfering with and destroying
the business of the plaintiff.°
In the field of security transactions it is recognized that "where harm to
the public is threatened, and the private interest infringed is reasonably
deemed to be of less importance, an official body can take summary action
pending a later hearing." 18 Thus in R. A. Holman & Co. v. SEC17 the court
8 Supra note 3, at 163.
2 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
10
 Id. at 895.
11
 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
12 Hoxsey Cancer Clinic v. Folsom, 155 F. Supp. 376 (D.D.C. 1957) ; Babbitt Auto
Parts Co. v. Fleming, 51 F. Supp. 360, (D.D.C. 1941).
la Green v. McElroy, supra note 11; Copper Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Campbell,
290 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
14 305 F.2d 692 (1st Cir. 1962).
15 The court also held, consistent with the position taken by the Supreme Court in
Joint Anti-Fascist Committee, supra note 3, that immunity extended against civil dam-
age suits to individual public officials does not extend to actions for declaratory and in-
junctive relief against a governmental agency.
16 R. A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 299 F.2d 127, 131 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Normal proce-
dural safeguards of a hearing prior to action by a commission are set aside on the
theory that speedy action is necessary and in the interest of public welfare where prompt-
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held valid the temporary suspension of the Broker-Dealers' exemption to deal
in regulation A offerings, even though it deprived the broker-dealer of a going
business without prior notice or hearing.
Public interest was a major consideration in Hannah v. Larche.' 8
 That
case involved the rules governing investigative procedures of the Commission
on Civil Rights against a claim that they violated the due process clause by
denying subpoenaed witnesses a fair hearing. The Court distinguished Joint
Anti-Fascist on the basis that it involved a final adjudication as to the status
of the names appearing on the list, whereas Hannah involved investigatory
proceedings which involved no conclusions about the activities of any
individual.
The court in Kukatush applied the Hannah test to the "Canadian Re-
stricted List" to determine if it was a blacklist and thus a violation of due
process since no prior hearing was allowed. However, the court supported its
decision, not with Hannah, which differed from Kukatush in that the harm
alleged was merely speculative and lacked a clear showing of personal interest,
but with cases in which there was a strong public interest argument."
The court must be seen as affirming the freedom of a government agency
to speak and communicate with those whom it has been directed by Congress
to regulate and protect without being subject to judicial review, particularly
where no charges are made against anyone, where the agency issues no orders,
and where no one is directed to do or not to do anything.
The decision in Joint Anti-Fascist is to be limited by the public interest
argument when applied to the field of administrative law and security transac-
tions. The case by case development of what constitutes blacklisting within
"due process" indicates that the Court will not apply Joint Anti-Fascist in
order to find standing to enjoin official action when there is an overriding
public interest behind the governmental action.
PHILIP H. GRANDCHAMP
Labor Law—Legality of Trade Shop, Struck Work and Chain Shop
Clauses—Section 8(e).—NLRB v. Amalgamated Lithographers of
America. 1—Upon complaint of an employer association the National Labor
ness of action on the part of the Commission may be the measure of its effectiveness in
preventing illegal activities. They are also set aside in instances where failure to take
ex parte action by the Commission before announcing investigations might lead to mar-
ket fluctuations and injury to innocent persons holding the suspect stock. See Section 19 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 898, 15 U.S.C. § 785(a) (4) (1958), granting
the SEC the authority "if in its opinion such action is necessary or appropriate for the
protection of investors" and "if in its opinion the public interest so requires" to suspend
summarily trading in a registered security for not more than ten days. See also Fahey
v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 253 (1947) where the "delicate nature of the institution [a
bank] and the impossibility of preserving credit during an investigation" justified sum-
mary action.
17 Supra note 16.
18 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
19
 R. A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, supra note 16; Hoxsey Cancer Clinic v. Folsom,
supra note 12; Fay v. Miller, supra note 5; Andrews v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co.,
83 F. Supp. 966 (D.D.C. 1949).
1 309 F.2d 31 (9th Cir. 1962), petition for cert. denied, 31 U.S.L. Week 3296 (U.S.
762
